DenMar, as a Government service contractor, has an obligation to all of our customers and the nation as a whole to be ever vigilant with any information or data that we come in contact with on our Government service contracts. We must be ever aware that we may be contacted via a number of different ways...e-mail, letters, telephone calls, faxes, social media, casual conversations during or after work, etc. We must also be alert and always cognizant of what is going on around us to ensure we safeguard our actions and words as well as actions of fellow co-workers and others we may come in contact with.

Insider Threats


It is a sad reality, but the United States has been betrayed by people holding positions of trust. Arguably, “insiders” have caused more damage than trained, foreign professional intelligence officers working on behalf of their respective governments. Not every suspicious circumstance or behavior represents a spy in our midst, but every situation needs to be examined to determine whether our nation’s secrets are at risks.

DSS Definition:

Insider threats are acts of commission or omission by an insider who intentionally or unintentionally compromises or potentially compromises DoD's ability to accomplish its mission. These acts include, but are not limited to, espionage, unauthorized disclosure of information, and any other activity resulting in the loss or degradation of departmental resources or capabilities.

How do you recognize an Insider Threat? Potential Espionage Indicators:

  • Failure to report overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals
  • Seeking to gain higher clearance or expand access outside the job scope
  • Engaging in classified conversations without a need to know
  • Working hours inconsistent with job assignment or insistence on working in private
  • Exploitable behavior traits
  • Repeated security violations
  • Attempting to enter areas not granted access to

Commonalities of those who have committed espionage since 1950:

  • More than 1/3 of those who committed espionage had no security clearance
  • Twice as many "insiders" volunteered as were recruited
  • 1/3 of those who committed espionage were nationalized U. S.
  • More recent spies acted alone
  • Nearly 85% passed information before being caught
  • Out of the 11 most recent cases, 90% used computers while conducting espionage and 2/3 used the internet to initiate contact

Why is the Insider Threat significant? An insider can have a negative impact on national security and industry resulting in:

  • Loss or compromise of classified, export-controlled, or proprietary information
  • Weapons systems cloned, destroyed, or countered
  • Loss of technological superiority
  • Economic loss
  • Loss of Life

Reportable Behaviors

Information Collection

  • Keeping classified materials in an unauthorized location
  • Attempting to access sensitive information without authorization
  • Obtaining access to sensitive information inconsistent with present duty requirements

Information Transmittal:

  • Using an unclassified medium to transmit classified materials
  • Discussing classified materials on a non-secure telephone
  • Removing classification markings from documents

Additional Suspicious Behaviors:

  • Repeated or un-required work outside of normal duty hours
  • Sudden reversal of financial situation or a sudden repayment of large debts or loans
  • Attempting to conceal foreign travel

How can YOU help?

YOU and your colleagues are the first line of defense against espionage. Help protect our national security by reporting any suspicious behavior that may be related to a potential compromise of classified information.

Be aware of the actions of those around you and report suspicious behaviors.

Foreign Travel and Foreign Contacts

Foreign travel: Foreign travel increases the risk of foreign intelligence targeting. You can be the target of a foreign intelligence or security services at any time and any place; the possibility of becoming the target of foreign intelligence activities is greater when you travel overseas.
Cleared and un-cleared individuals will submit an itinerary along with a DenMar Foreign Travel Reporting Form to the FSO for all official and unofficial foreign travel outside the United States. Any deviations from approved travel itineraries will be reported within five (5) days of return.

  • Travel to Puerto Rico, Guam, or other U.S. possessions and territories is not considered foreign travel and need not be reported.
  • Unplanned day trips to Canada or Mexico shall be reported upon return within five (5) business days.
  • FSO will administer a defensive security and counterintelligence security briefing prior to approved foreign travel.
  • Upon return from foreign travel, all covered individuals will complete a DenMar Foreign Travel Debrief Report form and forward it to the FSO.

Foreign Contacts: The company requires the reporting of contact(s) with a foreign national as part of a covered individual's official duties. Foreign activities that are to be reported include (a) application for and receipt of foreign citizenship and (b) application for, possession, or use of a foreign passport or identity card for travel. Reportable activities also include attempted elicitation, exploitation, blackmail, coercion or enticement to obtain classified information.

Collection techniques include:

  • Bugged hotel rooms or airline cabins
  • Intercepts of fax and e-mail transmissions
  • Recording of telephone calls/conversations
  • Unauthorized access and downloading, including outright theft of hardware and software
  • Installation of malicious software
  • Intrusions into or searches of hotel rooms, briefcases, luggage, etc.
  • Recruitment or substitution of flight attendants

Some common sense security countermeasures should include:

  • Do not publicize travel plans and limit sharing of information to people who need to know
  • Conduct pre-travel security briefings
  • Maintain control of sensitive information, media and equipment. Do not pack these types of articles in checked baggage.
  • Keep hotel room doors locked. Note how the room looks when you leave.
  • Limit sensitive discussion. Public areas are rarely suitable for discussion of sensitive information.
  • Do not use computer or fax equipment at foreign hotels or business centers for sensitive matters
  • Ignore or deflect intrusive or suspect inquiries or conversations about professional or personal matters
  • Keep unwanted sensitive materials until it can be disposed of securely


Dennis R. Holland, FSO (580) 355-8900 [office] or (580) 678-0062 [cell]

Darren Womack, Alternate FS0 (405) 949-2901 or (405) 306-5464 [cell]